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Abstract:    
The journey from reporting rape to convicting rapists is complex leading to high attrition and 
non-conviction rates.  After wide consultation, the law in England and Wales was revised in 
2003 to try to secure more convictions. In South Africa, a similar process occurred to produce 
a new law in 2007. Nonetheless reported rapes have risen and conviction rates have fallen in 
both jurisdictions and it has been suggested that the failure of the criminal justice system to 
GHDOZLWKµUDSH«HQFDSVXODWHVWKHVKHHULQDGHTXDF\RIWKHODZ¶:\NHVDQG:HOVK, 
2009:111) and offers little hope of justice to victims and little deterrence to perpetrators. In 
6RXWK$IULFDOLWWOHKDVFKDQJHGH[FHSWPRUHLVNQRZQDERXWµWKHOLYHGH[SHULHQFHVRIVH[XDO
YLROHQFH¶$UW]DQG6P\WKH, 2007:17) and more support is offered to victims after the event. 
This article explores the part played by law in dealing with rape, through a comparison of the 
United Kingdom and South Africa. Critical gendered analysis of their respective rape laws 
leads to the conclusion that that law cannot work effectively to deter or convict rapists: only 
meQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRFKDQJHFDQVWRSUDSH 
Introduction 
In South Africa 39,828 rapes were reported in 2016-17  (Africacheck, 2017). Conviction rates 
are hard to estimate as the South African National Prosecuting Authority does not 
disaggregate rape from other sexual assaults in its data1. A study by the Medical Research 
Council identified a sample of 3,952 rape cases recorded by police in 2012 of which 8.6% 
ended in conviction (Wilkinson, 2016). The Institute of Security Studies found that in some 
provinces only 4% of cases led to conviction (Vetten, 2014:6). In England and Wales in 
2016-17, police recorded 41,186 reports of rape, of which 4,520 were male rapes (ONS, 
2018). There were just 5,190 prosecutions and 2,991 convictions (CPS, 2017). This averages 
at about 7% of police recorded crime. Yet, seemingly progressive legislative changes were 
introduced in 2003 in England and Wales2 and in 2007 in South Africa to try to better address 
sexual violence. In this article our focus on rape law is for two reasons. It has been much 
invested in for many years to try to alleviate suffering to, most usually, women and girls (The 
London Rape Crisis Centre, 1984; Lees, 1996; Myhill and Allen, 2002; Walby and Allen, 
2004). Rape is considered a deeply serious offence in law, yet there is a huge disjuncture 
                                               
1
 Statistics on crime in South Africa are both less detailed, less contemporary and more difficult to access than 
in England. Vetten (2014) documents the difficulties in finding reliable and detailed data, for example on male 
rape victims. 
2
 The AFWZDVLQWHQGHGWREHµbrought into force simultaneously in England & Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland on 1 May 2004:  Police Circular: 4/2003 (2004) 
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between the seriousness the law and legal institutions attach to the crime and the lack of 
improvement in deterrence or conviction.   
The reasons for comparison between the United Kingdom and South Africa are the close 
relations of both legal systems and because the more recent South African law3 developed, to 
some extent, in relation to developments and critiques of the Sexual Offences Act 20034.. 
South Africa is a rapidly and an actively emerging post-apartheid cultural context where 
constitutional rights frame social progress, unlike the ongoing neo-liberal conservative socio-
political environment of the UK. Yet law reform has not seen any consequent reduction in 
rape or improvement in conviction in either country. This is despite long histories of copious 
research and writing about rape, some on law (McGlynn and Munro, 2010) but most on other 
areas such as victims (Garvey, 2005; Christofides et al., 2006); policing (Gregory and Lees, 
1999; Artz and Smythe, 2007); criminal justice processes (Kelly et al., 2005; Vetten et al., 
2008); media representation/stereotyping (Mahria, 2008; Wykes and Welsh, 2009) and 
support agencies (Lupton and Gillespie, 1994). All of these have contributed to knowledge 
but not seen a diminution in numbers of rapes reported or improvement in conviction rates. 
So might something be learned about that failure to deter and punish rapists by comparing the 
role of relatively newly and carefully crafted rape laws in a rapidly emerging African culture 
like South Africa with those in a long established Western democratic context like the UK? 
Rape and the Law: The United Kingdom 
Emerging legislation in England and Wales seems to have had little impact on reducing rape, 
indeed the available data almost suggest the opposite. Yet the process of reform was vigorous 
and the Home Office involved and consulted criminal justice professionals, advocacy groups 
and academics. Macgregor (2011) writes that in the UK, at the end of World War 2, only 240 
cases were reported. Yet in 2010-2011, a few years after the new Act came into force, there 
were 14,624 female rapes and 1,310 male rapes (Chaplin at al., 2011). This may not have 
been because more rapes were occurring but perhaps because the criminalisation of rape in 
marriage in 1991 and male rape in 1994, alongside feminist consciousness raising, were 
rewriting the meaning of sexual violence and liberating victims to report rape. The volume of 
rape is troubling enough in the reported data, yet in the UK some 89% of rapes are estimated 
to go unreported (ibid) a dark figure which has underwritten much scholarly work on rape 
YLFWLPV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRUHSRUWDQGYHU\HDUO\ZLWKGUDZDORIFRPSODLQWOHDGLQJWRQR-crimed 
cases (Kelly et al., 2005). Yet despite the dark figure, and victim reluctance, there has been a 
huge increase in reporting, an increase not matched by an increase in convictions. The 
erosion of cases before they reach court in England and Wales happens at several levels, 
according to research by Lovett and Kelly (2009): 45% are discontinued by police; 35% by 
the victim during the prosecution process; 6% by the Crown Prosecution Service and 50% of 
those actually going to trial are acquitted leaving approximately a 7% conviction rate by 
guilty plea or jury. Until the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 19765, rape was dealt with 
under common law. In 1977, one in three reported rapes led to conviction (Harris and Grace, 
1999) yet this had dropped to one in twenty by 2007 (Bourke, 2007). Recently the average 
conviction rate has remained at just over 7%, much as Lovett and Kelly (2009) found, with 
over 41,000 reports in 2016-17 resulting in 2991 convictions (CPS, 2017).  
                                               
3
 The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007 South Africa.  
4
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 England and Wales 
5
 Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1976 
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Much work highlights the way stereotypes and myths about rape inhibit proceeding to 
prosecution (Myhill and Allen, 2002) or, if prosecution goes ahead, there is a failure to 
convict. Other commentary on such poor justice for women, who comprise the vast majority 
of victims, has looked for explanations in sexist and even misogynistic practices and 
representations, reproduced via media discourses, both factual and fictional (Boyle, 2005).  
Such language is steeped in meaning and values which VKDSHERWKDYLFWLP¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI
what has happened to them, and the way they are treated throughout the whole prosecution 
process, contributing to secondary victimisation in the criminal justice system and the news 
media. There is little commentary on the fact that law is a constitutive part of that discursive 
context and so imbued with many of those same meanings5DWKHUODZ¶V authority gives it 
both a veneer of truth and a requirement to comply. 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (England and Wales) defines the experience of rape in legal 
terms. From the moment a woman reports the RIIHQFHµher experiences are (re)defined and 
(re)conceptualised to fit into the law DQGLWVFDWHJRULHV¶:\NHVDQG:HOVK, 2009: 112). The 
ODZKDVDQDFFRXQWRIUDSHZLWKZKLFKZRPHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHs must fit for a conviction to be 
likely: an account that fits with very particular models of male and female sexuality and leads 
to what could be described as a hermeneutics of suspicion WKDWVKDGRZVZRPHQ¶VDFFRXQWVRI
rape (Denike, 2000 in Kelly et al., 2006). Arguably, as conviction data suggest, this 
suspicion, across all areas of criminal justice practice, has increased alongside the legal 
changes since the 1970s. Moreover, Home Office statistics suggest that rape convictions 
range from 1% to 14% over England and Wales (Stern, 2010) ± with very puzzling and 
worrying variation between areas. Despite the apparent clarity of the Act, criminal justice 
practices and processes may well lead to it being interpreted and applied differently by 
different police forces, the Crown Prosecution Service, courts and jurors.   
Simply, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 c.42 Part 1 Rape Section 1 states:   
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if²  
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his 
penis,  
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and  
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.  
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the 
circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents6. 
The Act has attracted criticism (Temkin and Ashworth, 2004; Finch and Munro, 2006; 
Wykes and Welsh, 2009) largely in relation to rape, as opposed to the much broader remit it 
now offers for prosecuting, for example, child sexual abuses. The key areas of criticism have 
tended to be the retention from the 1976 Act of penile penetration as essential for rape, the 
issue of consent and the issue of reasonableness7, all of which, it is argued in the next section, 
maintain very traditional gendered norms and inhibit progress around rape.  
Rape and the Law: South Africa 
                                               
6
 In general, a person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offence unless two elements are present ± an actus reus 
(guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind).   
7
 Despite such criticism, both Northern Ireland and Scotland retained exactly the same focus on penile 
penetration, consent and reasonableness as the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in their later revised legislation on 
sexual offences: The Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 and Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. 
 4 
Such criticism of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 informed 6RXWK$IULFD¶VUHYLHZRIWKHLU
VH[XDORIIHQFHV¶ODZZKLFKVKDSHGWKHLUUHYLVHGAct in 2007. The UK, since the 1970s, has 
experienced something of a feminist and liberal political shift underpinning many changes in 
attitudes towards equity (in theory at least) alongside legislation around sexuality, racial 
HTXDOLW\DQGZRPHQ¶VULJKWV,Q6RXWK$IULFDWKHKLVWRU\of the contemporary problems 
around sexual violence, and struggles to stop it, are very different as also are the research, 
scholarship and activism that have developed to try to curtail the harm. South African 
(largely) feminist legal scholar activists have been highly critical of existing laws relating to 
sexual offences, including the 2003 Act of England and Wales.  
As in England and Wales, the law reform process was slow and incremental and subject to 
the inclinations and reasoning of state legal drafters and parliamentary committees. The 
process was initially characterised by enlivened debates about the reality of rape, optimism 
about the potential of the law to protect rape complainants, opportunities to be creative about 
legal solutions and extensive consultation with civil society organisations. This momentum 
decelerated DQGVWDJQDWHGDVYDULRXVLWHUDWLRQVRIWKHOHJLVODWLRQHPHUJHG$VWKHODZ¶V
intention morphed from protection to punishment, idealism surrounding the law as a powerful 
solution to the rape problem diminished.  
The 1957 Sexual Offences Act (32 of 1957) defined rape in South Africa in common law as 
µLQWHQWLRQDOXQODZIXOVH[XDOLQWHUFRXUVHZLWKDZRPDQZLWKRXWKHUFRQVHQW¶DQGVH[XDO
intercourse was defined as the penetration of the vagina by the penis (Milton, 1996: 435). 
Both this antiquated definition and the lack of a single statute to address sexual offences were 
the subject of considerable criticism (Pithey et al., 1998). With Statistics South Africa (2000) 
reporting national police statistics of rape at a staggering 49,280 per annum in 2000, the need 
for progressive law was a matter of distinct urgency.  
Finally, The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007 was 
passed by Parliament but it was a distilled version of the original Bill put out for public 
comment in 2003. This had included a range of comprehensive measures to protect victims of 
sexual offences which were excluded in 2007. The 2007 Act did very little to address the 
secondary victimisation of rape victims in their interactions with the criminal justice and 
health systems; an issue which motivated the law reform movement in the first instance. 
Substantive protection measures, such as the right to testify via CCTV, intermediaries, and in 
camera hearings were all replaced with a provision authorising the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions to issue directives on these matters to the members of the National 
Prosecuting Authority, the equivalent of the Criminal Prosecution Service in England and 
Wales. Provisions designed to shield the victim from facing confrontation with the accused 
were also removed from the final Act, so too were provisions that specifically referred to the 
use of expert testimony in rape trials and the promotion of prosecutor-led investigations in 
rape cases.  
Another unsurprising but disappointing loss was the rejection of a proposal that the new law 
specify certain legal duties on criminal justice personnel in relation to rape cases like the 
Domestic Violence Act (116 of 1998) which includes mechanisms for disciplinary action 
should the South African Police Service fail in their duty. But the Sexual Offences Act did 
not include any. This lack was indicative of an ideological shift from protecting rape 
survivors to more punitive measures which focus on criminalisation of sexual offences.   
The new definition of rape was extended to offences which include the penetration of the 
mouth, anus and genital organs of one person with the genital organs or another body part of 
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another person, or an object or part of the body of an animal without consent, rejecting the 
penile focus of earlier South African and English and Welsh law. Section 3 of the Act defines 
rape as:  
3. Any person (µA¶) who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual 
penetration with a complainant (µB¶), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of 
rape.  
So in both England and Wales and South Africa, two massive pieces of legislation were 
eventually constituted, each pre-empted by complex review and consultation. There are many 
similarities and significant differences. However, neither seems to work very effectively as 
instruments of prevention, protection or punishment, which begs the question: why not?  
Is rape law part of the problem: comparing the United Kingdom and South Africa? 
The three key areas of the 2003 Act, also adopted by the legislatures in Northern Ireland and 
Scotland,  that seem to inhibit justice are the continued model of rape requiring penile 
penetration; the definition of consent and the label reasonable,Q6RXWK$IULFD¶V Act, 
these are evident but differently configured: rape is forceful sexual violation not just 
penetration by a penis, coercion qualifies consent and context is used to explore reasons not 
individual reasonableness. In this section we explore the implications of similarities and 
differences in relation to failure to deter, or prosecute, or convict leaving potential victims 
and victims unprotected and with little recourse to justice.  
The Act of Penetration 
Unlike in South Africa, in the UK the actus reus of rape centres on penile penetration. 
Extending the Criminal Justice Public and Order Act 1994 which added anal to vaginal 
penetration, the 2003 Act also added oral violation by a penis to the definition. It 
acknowledges penetration by other body parts or objects but defines these not as rape but as 
sexual assault by penetration. As rape requires a penis, only men can rape, though the act 
includes penetration by a transsexual with a reconstructed penis as rape. Here then the penis 
is privileged as the organ of rape, discursively reducing other forms of violation to sexual 
assault, when they may actually be more damaging. This has been commonly held as true for 
VRPH\HDUVIRUH[DPSOHUHVHDUFKLQ1HZ=HDODQGGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWIHPDOHVXUYLYRUVµVDZ
all acts of penetration (vaginal, oral and anal) as a fundamental attack on their body and 
LQWHJULW\¶%DUULQJWRQ, 1984 in Wykes and Welsh, 2009:114). Phallocentric privileging 
suggests rape is one thing and penetrative sexual assault is another, when acts like urination 
into the victim and penetration with hands or objects often accompany penile penetration.  
This penile privileging in UK rape law relates to arcane gender values and practices, not least 
the devaluation of a woman to her father caused by the loss (theft) of her virginity (Temkin, 
2002). It also relates to highly particular Judaeo-Christian models of sexuality as only 
legitimate if reproductive and therefore necessitating a penis, which defines by default other 
models of sexual engagement as lesser.  Further concerns, privileging penile penetration as 
worse, include fears about disease, particularly the fear of AIDS/HIV from the 1980s. This is 
also evident in the South African law where access to post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) and 
the compulsory testing of alleged offenders feature prominently. Last, even popular opinion 
was given serious credence in the English sexual offences review that pre-empted the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, ZKLFKµIHOW>WKDW@UDSHZDVFOHDUO\XQGHUVWRRGE\WKHSXEOLFDVan offence 
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WKDWZDVFRPPLWWHGE\PHQRQZRPHQ¶+RPH2IILFH, 2000: para. 2.8.2004), hence a penis is 
obligatory. 
All these are arguments are rather easily challenged. Women are no longer literally bought 
and sold as virgin brides in England, nor owned by their husbands and: 
As regards the risk of pregnancy, the fact that pre-pubescent, post-menopausal, sterilised 
and infertile women can all be raped rather undermines this reasoning, as of course, does 
the fact that men can also be raped (Wykes and Welsh 2009:114).   
Rape can also be charged if a condom is used or the rapist does not ejaculate (Ormerod, 
2005) making pregnancy or disease unlikely. So despite one of the overall aims of the sexual 
offences review and resulting 2003 Act being to gender-neutralise the law around sexual 
violence (Home Office, 2000), it has instead retained a very conservative model of rape and 
the explanation for that is both logical and WURXEOLQJ/RJLFDOEHFDXVHµUDSH>LV@DFULPHRI
PHQDJDLQVWZRPHQ¶1DIILQH, 1994: 24) and to remove the penis from centrality to the 
definition of the offence would be to disguise the fact that rape is a crime that expresses 
PHQ¶VSRZHURYHUZRPHQWKURXJh sexual violence (Gillespie, 1994).  Troubling, because 
retaining penile penetration as the only way in which rape can occur simultaneously leaves in 
SODFHDQGZRUVHWUDLOVIRUZDUGYHU\VWHUHRW\SLFDOLGHDVDERXWPHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VVH[XDOLW\
This is not least because penile rape requires an erection and an erection requires sexual 
excitement and the inference is that the victim somehow causes this. Despite reforms, the 
vestiges of history are still apparent in the law. Women, and indeed their sexuality, remain 
regulated by a law that is embedded in deeply patriarchal historical origins; origins that 
define sex, and punish coercive sexual intercourse, in ways that have little to do with much of 
the lived experiences of women. UK rape law, as enacted by all three jurisdictions of the 
UK,is thus part of a continuous discourse that underwrites the sexual violation of women.    
In South Africa, on the other hand, the 2007 Act repealed the common law offence of rape ± 
the intentional, unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent ± and replaced 
LWZLWKDPRUHLQFOXVLYHVWDWXWRU\RIIHQFH7KHXVHRIWKHWHUPµVH[XDOSHQHWUDWLRQ¶LQWKHQHZ
$FWPHDQVWKDWDQDOSHQHWUDWLRQIRUFHGRUDOVH[DQGLQVHUWLRQRIRWKHUREMHFWVLQWRDYLFWLP¶V
anus or vagina also constitute rape. Sexual penetration is defined in s 1 as: 
Any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by- (a) the genital organs of 
one person into or beyond the genital organs, anus, or mouth of another person; (b) any 
other part of the body of one person or, any object, including any part of the body of an 
animal, into or beyond the genital organs or anus of another person; or (c) the genital 
organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of another person. 
This definition means that a penis does not have to be inserted more than slightly into or 
beyond these orifices and therefore does not need to be erect for it to penetrate.  It 
acknowledges the wide range of sexual acts that victims experience as rape. The definition is 
not object-specific, meaning that any other object or body part inserted into (or beyond) the 
genital organs or anus of another person, also constitutes sexual penetration. The fact that 
µREMHFWV¶DUHQRWGHILQHGDOORZVIRUWKHSHQHWUDWLRQRIDQ\REMHFWWREHFRQVLGHUHGZKHQ
considering an act of sexual penetration. However, unlike penetration by a genital organ, the 
insertion of an object into the mouth of another person does not constitute sexual penetration. 
The definition of sexual penetration also extends to cases where the genital organs of an 
animal are inserted into or beyond the mouth of another person.  
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Previously, some ± indeed most ± of these offences fell under the common law definition of 
indecent assault for instance, sexual acts such as inserting an object or finger into the vagina, 
anal rape (penetration with a penis) and inserting a penis into the mouth$VDµOHVVHUFKDUJH¶
this obviously had implications for sentencing, but most importantly denied the experience of 
rape as victims experienced it. Previously, a person charged with anal penetration could only 
be convicted of indecent assault. With the new formulation of rape, a person who commits an 
act of anal penetration would now be subject to the minimum sentencing applicable to rape, 
currently 10 years. The Act also created new statutory offences   meaning someone who 
compels or forces someone else to commit an act of rape can be charged with the crime of 
µFRPSHOOHGUDSH¶  
Unlike the UK, in South Africa the legal model does appear to be gender neutral and the 
extended definition of rape is possibly the single most major success of the 2007 Act. The 
gender-neutrality of the new definition now means that men and boys can be raped and that 
women can rape (i.e. sexually penetrating a man). The South African Act treats all 
penetrative sexual assault as rape so acknowledging a much wider range of sexual violence as 
rape and treating as equal such violations regardless of gender or sexual orientation.8 It is 
important to note, however, that the Act separates sexual offences into acts of penetrative 
(rape) and non-penetrative (sexual assault) offences. In contrast, definitions of penetration in 
law in the UK merely replicate no longer appropriate, however popular, stereotypes about 
PHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VVH[XDOLW\DVXQIRUWXQDWHO\VRGLGVRPH:HVWHUQIHPLQLVW7HPNLQ, 2002) 
and British government (Home Office, 2000) arguments. Nonetheless despite the improved 
South African definition of rape on paper it seems no more effective legislatively, in practice, 
going by report and conviction rates, than the archaic, phallocentric UK counterpart. So are 
there further reasons why conviction is so difficult, which also diminishes deterrence? 
Consent 
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 defined rape as sexual intercourse with a 
woman without her consent, without defining consent. Seeking crystal clarity the government 
meant the revised 2003 Act to provide a general legislative definition of consent in Section 
,WSURYLGHVWKDWµDSHUVRQFRQVHQWVLIKH(sic)9 agrees by choice, and has the freedom and 
FDSDFLW\WRPDNHWKDWFKRLFH¶107KHSUREOHPLVWKDWWKLVIRFXVHVRQWKHYLFWLP¶VVWDWHRIPLQd 
rather than on the GHIHQGDQW¶V state of mind and requires the prosecution to prove the absence 
of consent, when it is the defendant who should prove he had consent. Westmarland (2004) 
argues this leads to the victim rather than the defendant being the person on trial which of 
course, perpetuates precisely the same sexual norms and values as does a focus on penile 
penetration. The victim must have led him on, for him to be aroused.  Ipso facto women are 
responsible for male sexual behaviour. In the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the inclusion in the 
definition of terms like choice, freedom and capacity was meant to suggest consent should be 
equally negotiated. In 2005, a defining case, R v Dougal11, revealed how far from ideal this 
definition was when a woman student, too intoxicated to remember her rape but also too 
drunk to remember having said no, was deemed to have consented. Any man actually 
                                               
8
 In the United Kingdom, the ODFNRIHTXLW\KDVVSDZQHGUHVHDUFKRQPHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHVRIVH[XDOYLRODWLRQ
including by women (Weare, 2017). Weare inteUYLHZHGPHQZKRKDGEHHQµIRUFHGWRSHQHWUDWH¶ZRPHQ
described their experience as rape whereas the law would describe it as a sexual assault.  
9
 The male pronoun is used even though the vast majority of victims are women and girls, again indicative of the 
arcane, male values reproduced by the 2003 law.  
10
 Section 75(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 lists six conditions where consent is deemed not possible, 
which inform s 76, for example if the complainant was asleep or unconscious at the time. 
11
 R v Dougal [2005] Swansea Crown Court 435 
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convicted of rape nowadays, in the UK, must feel singularly unlucky, given such judicial 
precedents.  
During the drafting period for drawing up a new South African Sexual Offences Act, much 
debate took place as to whether to retain the element of consent in the definition of rape. In 
practice, it is usually quickly established that intercourse took place ± through medico-legal/ 
forensic evidence or it is admitted by the accused ± so what remains is whether the 
complainant consented. This often means that rape trials focus on whether the complainant 
was willing to have sex. For this reason, in an early version of the Sexual Offences Bill, the 
South African Law Reform Commission justified the removal of the element of consent in 
favour of a focus on coercion: 
7KHDGYDQWDJHRIXVLQJWKHWHUPµFRHUFLYHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶LQVWHDGRIµFRQVHQW¶ZDVVHHQWR
be multiple: it bore recognition of the fact that perpetrators routinely employ different 
methods to ensure the submission or compliance of their chosen victim «; it 
acknowledged that it is unacceptable in court for the actions and behaviours of the rape 
complainants to be interrogated to a greater extent than those of the accused; and it 
UHOLHYHGWKHSURVHFXWLRQRIVRPHRIWKHEXUGHQRISURRIUHJDUGLQJWKHYLFWLP¶VODFNRI
consent (Fuller, 2007: 11).  
Removing consent from the definition of rape would have meant, in theory, a shift from the 
question of whether the complainant had consented to sex towards whether the accused had 
used coercion in order to have sex with the complainant. However, the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development argued that even if consent 
ZDVWDNHQRXWRIWKHGHILQLWLRQWKHDFFXVHGFRXOGVWLOOUDLVHµFRQVHQW¶DVDGHIHQFHmaking 
removal of consent an important, but merely symbolic, shift in the law.   
Under the new SA $FWFRQVHQWLVGHILQHGDVµYROXQWDU\DQGXQ-coerced agUHHPHQW¶VHFWLRQ
1(2)), with a non-exhaustive list of coercive circumstances where voluntary and un-coerced 
agreement is presumed to be absent. The list includes: the use of force or intimidation; a 
threat of harm; abuse of power or authority; false pretences or fraudulent means; incapability 
in law of appreciating the nature of the sexual act, as in (i) asleep; (ii) unconscious; (iii) in an 
altered state of consciousness, including under the influence of any medicine, drug, alcohol or 
other substance, to the extent that consciousness or judgement is adversely affected; (iv) a 
child below the age of 12 years; or (v) a person who is mentally disabled. Mills (2010: 258) 
has argued this formulation of the definition creates a µpositive consent standard whereby 
only ³yes means yes´¶Moreover, coercion is not limited to force or threat of rape but 
includes more subtle factors that negate consent. The term harm is important as it allows for a 
VHPEODQFHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\LQWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶s perception. So harm might be reputational 
KDUPRUGDPDJHILQDQFLDOKDUPRUKDUGVKLSRUKDUPWRDQ\PDWHULDODVSHFWRIDYLFWLP¶VOLIH
An additional unique dimension of this definition is that threats or force exerted can also be 
directed against a person (the complainant) or property or against another person (a family 
member, for instance).  
False pretence is also a progressive provision, but raises some interesting questions about 
what constitutes a false pretence. There are several examples:  mistaken identity, deception 
DQGPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ:LWKUHVSHFWWRDSHUVRQµLQFDSDEOHLQODZRIDSSUHFLDWLQJWKHQDWXUH
RIWKHVH[XDODFW¶± through sleep, unconsciousness or substance affected ± the Act simply 
codified the existing common law.  In relation to children under the age of 12, under the 
common law, there is an irrebuttable presumption that girls under the age of 12 cannot 
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consent to sex12 and gender neutrality now ensures boys under the age of 12 are protected. 
The statutory protection of persons who are mentally disabled is a new dimension.  
Despite the creditable effort at a non-exhaustive list of circumstances, some remained 
sceptical. Mills (2010: 251) argues that: 
WKHOLVWRIµFRHUFLYHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶GRQRWFRPSUHKHQVLYHO\UHIOHFWRQHRIZRPHQDnd 
JLUOV¶PRVWFRPPRQHQFRXQWHUVZLWKVH[XDOFRHUFLRQZKLFKLVUDSHE\DSHUSHWUDWRU
known to them, often in dating and marital relationships. Nor do they adequately take 
DFFRXQWRIZRPHQ¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WRVH[XDOH[SORLWDWLRQWKURXJKH[WUHPHSRYHUW\ 
There was also speculation about whether the new formulation would mean victims not 
having to prove that they did not consent with, instead, the defence simply shifting to trying 
to prove non-FRHUFLRQ7KXVLQERWKOHJLVODWXUHVµFRQVHQW¶KRZHYHUGLIIHUHQWO\ framed, 
remains in practice a deeply problematic area in relation to conviction. Merely changing the 
terms used seems to do little to change the cultural meanings and practices associated with 
gender and sexuality with women discursively confined to very traditional models of 
respectable femininity or blamed for their demise if they do not. 
A further area of revision and contention is the notion of reasonableness, which impelled 
much of the reform in England. AfWHUDFRPPHQWE\WKH+RXVHRI/RUGVWKDWµDPan could be 
found not guilty of rape if he had an honest, even if unreasonable, belief that a woman was 
FRQVHQWLQJ¶0F*O\QQ, 2010:139), protestors described UK rape law as a UDSLVW¶VFKDUWHU. In 
South Africa there is much less focus on the offender as a subject and much more on the 
context of the sexual act:  a context construed as constitutional and interpersonal and a focus 
more on reasons than reason. 
Reason/reasons 
In England, the 1975 case of DPP v Morgan13 established that an accused who made an 
honest mistake had no mens rea and could not be convicted. The 2003 Sexual Offences Act 
added the requirement of reasonableness to the requirement of honesty, despite strong 
parliamentary opposition. At first this seemed a victory for the feminist lobby but it was 
rapidly exposed as pyrrhic, as it became clear that the reasonableness measure being used 
was the subjective one of the defendant, not an objective one that a majority of people might 
concur on. Here again it is the victim who is the examined object: did she tease, flirt or had 
she previously had sex with the defendant, which might lead him to reasonably believe she 
would be consenting? The reasonableness component allows for the trotting out of clichéd 
LGHDVDERXWZRPHQ¶VEHKDYLRXUE\GHIHQGDQWDQd barrister alike; ideas which may well 
resonate with jurors and of course victims, whose self-blame often underpins attrition. In 
2002 the prevalence of such ideas was demonstrated by Clarke et al. (2002) who found many 
PHQFODLPHGWREHOLHYHµQR¶PHDQWµPD\EH¶DQGµPD\EH¶PHDQWµ\HV¶)XUWKHULGHDV
FRPPRQO\KHOGZHUHWKDWZRPHQOLNHDµELWRIURXJK¶DQGSUHWHQGUHVLVWDQFH7HPNLQ, 2002); 
that women need softening up with alcohol to admit what they really want (Masher and 
Anderson, 1986) or that a reluctant woman must have lesbian tendencies and needs a good 
µVHHLQJWR¶WRVRUWKHURXW7KLV last is a belief even more common in South Africa, where 
YLFWLPV¶UHSRUWVLPSOLFDWHSolice alongside perpetrators: µSome policemen in the township 
                                               
12
 Presentation by Waterhouse (2009) at the GHJRU, University of Cape Town. 
13
 DPP v Morgan [1975] UKHL 3, [1976] AC 182, [1975] 2 WLR 913, [1975] 2 All ER 347, 61 Cr App R 136, 
[1975] Crim LR 717 was a 1975 decision of the House of Lords. 
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mock you saying: 'How can you be raped by a man if you are not attracted to them?' (Filhani, 
2011). 
With such ideas still so culturally prevalent, it can be suggested in UK courts, that any 
reasonable man might espouse them honestly, as if immune from decades of efforts to change 
attitudes to women in the West. Ironically perhaps, as was recognised in the review pre-
empting the 2003 AFWµWKHPRUHVWXSLGDQGVH[LVWWKHPDQDQGKLVDWWLWXGHVWKHEHWWHUWKH
chance he ha[d] of being acquLWWHG¶Law Commission, 2000: para. 7.20 (2)). Ministers 
agreed that the phrase reasonable in all circumstances must allow for consideration of all 
relevant characteristics of the defendant. It could also infer that a broader situation such as a 
party, or shared drink, or previous sexual relationship might mean some individuals 
genuinely believed it reasonable to expect sex, again focusing the lens of credibility on the 
woman.  
As with consent, reasonable belief, may also be claimed on the basis of the womaQ¶VVH[XDO
history, which is a readily made plea, given that: 
For the majority of female victims of rape or assault by penetration (including attempts), 
the offender was a partner or ex-partner (45%) or someone who was known to them other 
than as a partner or family member (38%). (ONS, 2017) 
Such men can easily claim reasonable belief on the basis of a history of consensual sex or 
ongoing friendship or familiarity. Despite the efforts under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 199914 to curtail the use of sexual history evidence, there is ample evidence that 
this is routinely flouted (Kelly et al., 2006) by barristers to show consent, reasonable belief or 
to protect their male clients¶ human rights (McGlynn, 2010).  
The existence of a relationship between perpetrator and victim also characterises rape in 
South Africa (Mills, 2010) but the 2007 law avoided the pitfalls of reasonable belief and 
instead sought to focus on reasons for rape in context such as a previous lack of state 
protection for individual dignity, poverty and deprivation and a cultural history of deeply 
unequal gender relations.  The transition to a democratic state meant the passing of a new 
South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996)15 and Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights set out 
fundamental protections for South Africans and enshrined a number of rights of particular 
significance to women. These include the right to equality, including on the basis of gender, 
sex and sexual orientation; the right to human dignity; the right to freedom and security of the 
person, which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources;, the right to adequate housing; the right to access to health care, food, water 
and social security; and the right to access to court. These rights, according to Pithey et al. 
LPSO\µthat the state has a duty to prevent, investigate, punish and, where possible, 
compensate for violations of the right to freedom from violence such as rape'.   
Although deeply ideologically commendable it is difficult to find any evidence of such 
arguments being brought to bear on behalf of victims of sexual violence, rather the opposite. 
Defendants in both sexual and domestic (often indistinguishable) cases now routinely argue 
povertyµFXVWRPDQGSUDFWLFH¶DEXVHGFKLOGKRRGVFXOWXUDOQRUPVDQGGLVDGYDQWDJHDVD
legacy of apartheid to explain their actions. In sum, increasingly either colonialism, 
epitomised by the oppressive, exploitative, racism of apartheid, or the state is being blamed. 
                                               
14
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 c.23 Part II Chapter 3 Section 41 
15
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996) 
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A gang rape indicates the explanatory discourses resorted to when seven young men were 
µsuspected of holding the girl as a sex slave in a Soweto township residence, filming the rapes 
with a mobile phone and offering her coins to NHHSTXLHW¶Aljazeera, 2012). Comments from 
a female medical researcher and gender activist focused not on blaming the men, who 
encouraged each other in the assault, but rather they argued context was to blame:  
Massive unemployment, poverty, easy access to weapons and the lingering effects of the 
racial oppression of apartheid have been cited as reasons for the persistently high levels of 
violent crime: µWe come from a history of violence, where people have lived and grown 
up using violence in order to get what they want, to settle conflicts¶ Lisa Vetten, a gender 
activist said (ibid). 
Women too suffer from deprivation, racism and violent histories yet seem not to turn to 
dangerousness like men when disempowered (Campbell, 1993). The focus on context in 
South African law makes it very difficult to consider rape through a gendered lens despite it 
being a crime overwhelmingly perpetrated on women and girls (men and boys) by men. 
So, consent, coercion, reason and context, however defined and thoughtfully (or not) 
inscribed in law, seem not to work in practice to either secure conviction or deter sexual 
violence. So if law is not there to deter perpetrators, protect victims and prevent further harm 
through effective prosecution then perhaps a question which needs to be asked is what, 
actually, are these laws doing? 
What does rape law actually do in the United Kingdom and South Africa? 
The similarities in the constitution of the law between the United Kingdom and South Africa 
may be more profound in helping to explain the high levels of rape and low levels of 
conviction, than are the differences. However, South Africa has at least moved away from a 
phallocentric measure of sexual activity and is, therefore, ideologically and politically 
equipped to potentially shift meanings around gender and violence in a way that is impossible 
through British law. Indeed, it challenges credulity that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 should 
have introduced precisely those phallocentric definitions of rape at the moment they were 
being dismissed by the South African review team as inadequate law. Nonetheless and 
despite these criticisms, the problem seems to be a general over investment in the potential of 
doctrinal law to right wrongs and an underestimation of the extent to which any discourse, 
however (re)constructed, will tend to serve power. Simply, the goals of the new legislations 
were ahead of their popular meaning potential so that the intended meanings associated with 
the new revisions were culturally inchoate. All that seems to have happened is that old 
meanings have emerged attached to the new discursive formulations. New law has replaced 
old but the old cultural myths and stereotypes that define gender and sexuality were not 
simultaneously reconstructed and have simply been attached to the new formats in practice. 
Sigsworth (2009) discusses how forced sex or rape are firmly associated with violent, 
VWUDQJHUDWWDFNV7KHVHLGHDVDUHGHHSO\HQWUHQFKHGDV6RXWK$IULFDQPHQ¶VVHQVHRI
entitlement to sex which means any sign of friendliness from a woman might be deemed a 
sexual invitation. Sigsworth argues: 
The taking of sex is a relatively simple but violent performance of masculinity that can 
achieve a feeling of ascendancy over both women and other men: rape asserts the 
subjectivity and physical power of a man whose status might otherwise be insecure, and 
humiliates the victim as object. In a society where unequal gender relations are coupled 
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with ideologies of sexual entitlement and the availability of women for sexual use, the 
opportunities for sexual violence are manifold. (Sigsworth, 2009: 17-22) 
In the United Kingdom inequity may not be so overt nor extreme sexual violence so common 
but the evidence of misogyny and objectification of women is pervasive. Sexual harassment, 
revenge pornography and rape threats are now frequently played out anonymously via social 
media (Wykes, 2017) supporting just that same culture of male entitlement. In some ways the 
situation for justice for women is worse now than prior to the legislative innovation as 
arguably there was wide consultation, and much liberal and feminist input to the changes, 
making it difficult now to protest about the revised laws in the three jurisdictions of the 
United Kingdom, ensuring their continuing flawed potential.  
That law is not working very well to protect women is a truism but law is the most powerful 
discourse of authority we have. It sits just beneath outright violence, the rule of force as a 
mechanism of social control and normalisation, and DVVXFKLWVµFRQWHQWDQGRSHUDWLRQLV
FORVHO\ERXQGXSZLWKSROLWLFDODJHQGDV¶0F*O\QQDQG0XQUR, 2010:12), including gendered 
politics and the shoring up of patriarchal power. So it is reasonable to assume that law may 
not be preventing rape or helping women rape victims but it is doing something. In this 
section we try to think through these laws less in relation to their purported role against 
sexual violence and more in terms of what is actually being achieved by each piece of 
legislation, and what if anything might be done to actually stop rape. 
In the United Kingdom, rape law protects men and maintains models of appropriate sexual 
RUJDQLVDWLRQWKDWSHUSHWXDWHZRPHQ¶VYLFWLPKRRGFRQVROLGDWLQJtheir place on what Kelly 
(1988) dubbed a continuum of sexual violence. But it does more than that as it shores up 
PHQ¶VSRZHUJHQHUDOO\ERWKVH[XDODQGRWKHr. So, there is no real dichotomy of sex crime 
versus act of power which characterises much feminist debate about rape. Rape is about 
power: the physical power to act, to take what is not offered, indeed to take what you might 
perceive to belong to another man, and the power to prove consent happened and you were 
reasonable to assume it (Brownmiller, 1975). But rape is also about sex (Mckinnon, 1989) 
because the law states only men can rape, which is privileging one very small aspect of 
human sexuality as more important than any other and even the South African legislation 
retains various penetrations (simulacra of intercourse) in its definition. In the United 
Kingdom, the very reason defence lawyers have found ways to question women about their 
sexual history despite, for example in England and Wales, the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 is just so to secure power over courts¶ views on consent and 
reasonableness, including jurors, by playing to outmoded ideas about respectable femininity, 
outside of which mode any woman is asking for it. McColgan (1996:225) argued WKDWµVH[XDO
history is improperly employed to secure acquittals for men who have been guilty of rape¶ 
and it seems little has changed since, in either the language used about victims or about 
rapists.  
In the South African legislation it is different. Section 227(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
(CPA)16 states that an application must be made to the court to use sexual history evidence. 
Section 227(6) states that an application will not be granted if the evidence in question is 
sought to support the inference that by reason of the complainant¶s sexual experience (or 
conduct), the complainant is more likely to have consented to the offence or is less worthy of 
belief. ,QDFRQWH[WZKHUHZRPHQDUHURXWLQHO\UHJDUGHGDVµGHVHUYLQJ¶UDSHIRUEHLQJJD\
drunk or in the wrong place at the wrong time, the notion of women as ¶provocateurs¶ of 
                                               
16
 Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) Act 51 1977 
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sexual assault continues to have considerable cultural currency in South Africa, as it still does 
in the United Kingdom. Those cultural inflections are regularly reproduced in the news media 
in both countries. 
For example, in 2012 two professional footballers were tried for rape of the same teenage 
woman in Cardiff, Wales, which they denied, claiming consent17. Both men were cleared of 
rape but Evans was only cleared in 2016, after serving some of his sentence and two appeals, 
with the jXGJHDWWKHVHFRQGDOORZLQJWKH\RXQJZRPDQ¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\WREHDGPLWWHGDV
fresh evidence18. Evans then successfully sued his first legal team for damages. The liberal 
Independent newspaper reported the appeal process, which focused, like R v Dougal [2005] 
on drunken consent. Baxter (2016) wrote: 
Evans admitted that he lied in order to get a key for the hotel room that the woman was in 
DQGWKDWKHOHIWDIWHUZDUGVYLDWKHILUHHVFDSHKHDOVRVDLGWKDWKHGLGQ¶WVSHDNWRWKH
woman before, during or after having sex with her. Evans¶defence team said: µDrunken 
consent is nevertheless consent. While disinhibited through drink, she did consent to sex. 
Lack of memory does not equal lack of consent.¶ 
The article was critical of the jXGJH¶VGHFLVLRQWRDOORZWKHGHIHQFHteam to call the young 
ZRPDQ¶V ex-boyfriends as witnesses, who answered defence questions about her sexual 
behaviour, but it does not engage with the problems of consent and reasonableness. Covertly 
the article even continues the misogyny it describes, in relation to using sexual history in 
court, by repeating vitriolic social media messages about the young woman. These messages 
named her, called her a liar, a slag, spiteful, a c**t and a manipulative lass (ibid). Nor does 
WKHDUWLFOHTXHVWLRQWKHPHQ¶Vbehaviour in taking turns to have sex with an unknown young 
woman, too drunk to recall the act. Masculine values are not challenged nor explained.   
In 2018, in the UK in Northern Ireland, two rugby footballers were tried for rape and two 
further players for sexual assault of the same young woman. All were acquitted. Again the 
case hinged on consent. The Guardian reported the trial: [In court the nineteen year old]: 
complainant had to spend eight days in the witness box, being cross-examined by four sets 
of barristers, all men. Her bloodied thong was passed to the jury for examination (Mackay, 
2018). 
She was unknown to the players and had been at a club where they were celebrating. After 
closing time a group headed to a private house to a party: µShe did not know any of them, and 
ODWHUFRXOGQ¶WUHFDOOZKRLQYLWHGKHU¶LELG Photographs were taken and shown in court: 
µMcIlroy with Olding. They have their trousers down, facing the other young women on the 
VRIDGDQFLQJLQWKHLUER[HUVKRUWV¶LELG The two accused, the rape defendants, later 
allegedly boasted of their joint venture on Whatsapp GHVFULELQJWKHVH[DVµVSLW-URDVWLQJ¶DQG
WKHPVHOYHVDVµWRSVKDJJHUV¶7KHalleged H[FKDQJHHQGHGZLWKWKHFRPPHQWµ0DWH, no jokes 
VKHZDVLQK\VWHULFVZDVQ¶WJRLQJWRHQGZHOO¶ (ibid). The young woman claimed the sex had 
been very rough and she had panicked and frozen. She had told friends the next morning, 
gone to Rape Crisis and sought medical help for bleeding and had swabs taken. The 
following day she went to the police. Yet the defence focused on consent and challenged the 
veracity RIWKHZRPDQ¶VDFFRXQW. One barrister commented that she was µmoving from truth 
to untruth, or falsehood and self-GHOXVLRQ¶LELGProtests by women after the verdict of not 
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 R v Chedwyn Michael Evans and Clayton Rodney McDonald [2012] EWCA Crim 2559 
18
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guilty saw them ODEHOOHGµIHPLQD]LV¶. The article does discuss the evident misogyny of rugby 
culture and reports a UN rapporteur¶VFRPPHQWWKDWµmasculinity pervades our courts¶LELG 
but this article is an example of 7KH*XDUGLDQ¶Vµlong read¶ (several full pages). These are in-
depth research based reports rather than everyday crime news and yet the piece still barely 
explores why men might behave in such ways.  
There is virtually no critical comment in news outlets in such cases about the presumption of 
heterosexual men that they have a right to use a completely unknown, very drunk, teenage 
girls to share for sex and sometimes share the act digitally or send lewd messages about it on 
social media. The lack of attention to male behaviour is precisely what the element of 
µFRQVHQW¶GRHV,WWXUQVWKHUDSHLQVLGHRXWZKHUHUDSHFRPSODLQDQWVKDYHWRMXVWLI\WKHLU
actions (non-FRQVHQWDJDLQVWHIIRUWE\WKHSURVHFXWLRQWRSURYHµFRQVHQW¶8QWLOVXFK
assumptions are challenged in court as well as the news, jurors and judiciary will be 
µHQFRXUDJHG¶WRDFFHSWWKHPDVreasonable and so hegemonic heterosexuality is shored up for 
all men through the symbolism of that lack of challenge. This is precisely what Brownmiller 
(1975) meant by all men are rapists, in that all male power is secured by the few men who do 
rape. 
But such a crime is also about sex because it is a rape charge which tells us, 
commonsensically, that it was penile penetration and that is the µZRUVW¶FULPHEHFDXVHLWLVWKH
PHDQVE\ZKLFKDPDQFDQµWDNH¶DQRWKHU¶VZRPDQIDWKHURUSDUWQHURUSRWHQWLDOSDUWQHUDQG
besmirch her value. It tells the story of ownership, of monogamous reproductive cells 
(Foucault, 1978). It simultaneously denies all other modes of sexual expression as lesser and 
shores up very traditional models of sexuality and gender roles. It is politically patriarchal, 
conservative and retrogressive. For Foucault, the Victorian focus on the family serviced 
middle-class socio-economic power, by reproducing discursively heteronormative gender 
PRGHOVWKDWDOLJQHGZRPHQ¶VVH[XDOLW\ZLWKPDUULDJHPRWKHUKRRGDQGPRQRJDP\)RXFDXOW
barely acknowledged that the family construct, as part of a technology of control also 
serviced patriarchDOSRZHUYHU\QLFHO\+HGLGWKRXJKUHFRJQLVHWKDWµWKHH[HUFLVHRISRZHU
KDVDOZD\VEHHQIRUPXODWHGLQWHUPVRIODZ¶)RXFDXOW, 1975:87 which in turn informs many 
social narratives about meanings and values in our world. Mort (1987) did recognise that 
power was largely male, though complexly, intersected by class, race, sexuality etc. and that 
PDVFXOLQHµFRQVWUXFWHGVH[XDOLWLHVLGHQWLWLHVDQGSOHDVXUHVKDYHEHHQFRPSOH[O\ZULWWHQLQWR
PDQ\RIWKHVWUXFWXUHVRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOGRPLQDWLRQ¶S'HFRQVWUXFWLQJVXFK
writing, whether in the law or the news, can reveal the power they serve. 
News about male sexual violence in South Africa, similarly to the British news, focuses on 
the woman or women victims rather than the perpetrator and rarely engages with masculinity 
as problematic. In the trial of Pastor Omotoso in 2018 reports focused closely on the victim 
and repeated verbatim parts of cross questioning which doubted her word and asked why she 
had not fought or screamed as µWhy did you not scream, mam? You knew there were other 
people in the house, they would hear you?¶(IOL News, 2018). Again other men are 
implicated in the rapes: 
Alleged accomplices Lusanda Solani, 36 of Durban, and Zukiswa Sitho, 28, of Port 
Elizabeth, allegedly recruited girls all over the country and monitored their movements in 
the houses where they were being kept. (ibid) 
As in the United Kingdom accounts there is no discussion, in this case, or that of the Soweto 
rapes, in South African news, of men working with other men to abuse nor of the sense of 
entitlement which underwrites such violation. The Omotoso trial was delayed to allow the 
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defence attorney to go to the Court of Appeal and seek to have the judge recused on the 
grounds of bias. The judge then recused himself. The case restarts on 30 July 2019. Cheryl 
Zondi, ZKREURNHGRZQDVVKHWHVWLILHGWKDW2PRWRVR¶UDSHGDQGVH[XDOO\DVVDXOWHGKHUIURP
WKHDJHRI¶ (Naidoo, 2019) faces having to re-testify. She identifies the process of giving 
testimony as secondary victimisation because of the gruelling questioning from defence 
counsel trying to discredit her account. The three accused face 97 charges.  
Revealingly, joint venture and indeed gang rape generally, expose much rape as being more 
about men competing for power with other men in a kind of homophobic will to prove their 
heterosexual machismo (Kimmel, 1994) rather than desire for a woman. The prevalence of 
gang rape amongst men in deeply competitive masculine proximities such as football, the 
armed forces, fraternities in the US, street gangs and indeed city investment bankers (The 
Telegraph, 2012VHHPVWRFRQILUP.LPPHO¶VWKHRU\,WLVXQOLNHO\WKDWTXHVWLRQLQJE\
prosecutors about the meaning of joint enterprise ever arises in court as it is not central to 
law, but the effect is that even legal prosecutors seem to accept that men like to have joint sex 
with semi-conscious, drunken, unresponsive and/or mentally disadvantaged women for 
themselves and each other, as she clearly cannot benefit. Such acts are increasingly recorded 
on mobile phones, as in the, previously mentioned, Soweto case, and can be uploaded to 
YouTube allowing immediate identification of the perpetrators and an audience of millions. 
What further evidence is needed of PHQ¶V sense of right and their power to get away with it 
than publicly distributing recordings? Rather than challenge the masculinity and power at the 
heart of such violence, old stereotypes about victims are circulated in both press and public 
instances.  
In many rape cases, men are filming themselves and/or watching other men take turns with a 
helpless victim and this is not queried in the news or the courts. Indeed, in such instances 
other men are complicit with the act by either watching the clips, or tweeting support rather 
than challenging rape. This public and mediated discourse mimics the masculinism that sits 
so comfortably in a rape court which seems, for all it purports, to be about protecting men 
from false accusation rather than about protecting rape victims, either in court, or from future 
assaults by wrongly acquitted men. Indeed, it could be argued that prosecuting rape is more 
DERXWQRWSURVHFXWLQJLWDQGSURWHFWLQJPHQ¶VSRZHURYHUZRPHQDQGUHWDLQLQJSRZHUIRUDOO
men of power including police officers, prosecutors, barristers, judges, academics and so 
forth, by only imprisoning the other rapist ± the dangerous stranger who violates the property 
of another. Celebrity masculinity, with its associated power and status, seems close to 
immune from blame, whilst the very few successful prosecutioQVRIµRUGLQDU\¶SDUWQHURUGDWH
rape discursively underpin heterosexual and patriarchal interpersonal relationships:  
At both an individual and general level, the law has thus left the dangerous body literally 
free to act again whilst also metaphorically shoring up very traditional meanings about 
sexual bodies that have implications beyond the courtroom for gender identity and 
subjectivity. (Wykes and Welsh, 2009:129)   
This is the work being done by rape law in the UK. It preserves male power, over women and 
other men, both of whom might threaten that authority. These ideas are not new, just ideas 
not foregrounded frequently enough in academic accounts of sexual violence in the West 
which tend, as does the law, court and news, to focus on the victim.  
South Africans, though, do try to do things differently:  
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MDVFXOLQHSRZHULVRIWHQGHILQHGWKURXJKPHQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRDIIHFWWKHLUZLOO « sex can 
therefore be seen as an indicator to other men of position, status and masculinity «Men 
who rape are often more concerned about their own position relative to other men and to 
women than to their victim. (Sigsworth, 2009:13) 
7KLVFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQUHSOLFDWHV.LPPHO¶V(1994) perspective explicitly. Sigsworth wrote 
this in a report on sexual violence in South Africa for the Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation which focuses on inequity, structure, culture, conflict and systemic 
IDLOXUHDSSURDFKHVUDUHLQ:HVWHUQOLWHUDWXUHEXWQRWXQVXUSULVLQJJLYHQ6RXWK$IULFD¶V
radical thinking about conflict in all contexts. In South Africa the new law was part of 
massive social change rather than liberal conservative appeasement and it was drafted with 
critical awareness of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and cognisant of the importance of the 
Akayesu case (ICTR-96-4-t judgement 2 September 1998)19 on the Rwandan rapes which 
refused to deal with rape as body parts but contextualised in conflict, power and genocide. In 
updating the law to the Sexual Offences Act 2007, the Chamber rejected models of penile 
penetration, consent and reason. It: 
Expressly eschewed attempts to prescribe a list of sexual acts that would constitute rape «
purported to move away from the consent threshold ... and rightly privileges surrounding 
context and structural inequality and moves away from inappropriate individualistic focus 
on sexual autonomy. (McGlynn and Munro, 2010:2) 
In South Africa gang rape is very common: It PD\EHµMDFNUROOLQJ¶ZKHUHDJLUOVHHQDVDVQRE
or unattainable is degraded, while µVWUHDPOLQLQJ¶ describes the process of coercing sex as an 
entitlement. Each publicly demonstrates the rapist¶s virility to other males (Sigsworth, 2009). 
Yet, although power is much more clearly foregrounded in both press and policy and 
academic discourses in South Africa than in the United Kingdom, it is law that is still seen as 
a key means of challenging WKHGDQJHURXVQHVVRIPHQ¶Vwill to power in both legislatures. 
But, law, however subtly and differently it conceptualises rape, has contributed little to the 
work of stopping rape because both law and rape, however formulated, serve male power and 
authority, including the power of some men over others.  
Concluding thoughts 
In Britain there seems to be a kind of stasis on what to do about sexual violence but South 
Africa is a rapidly evolving post conflict democracy with many emerging initiatives which 
may yet offer the West a better way to stop gendered violence of all kinds. Since the passage 
of the Sexual Offences Act, South African (largely feminist) advocacy groups and academics 
have been methodically monitoring the implementation of the Act (cf GHJRU, 2019) and 
continue to make submissions to Parliament about the limitations of the law. They also use 
µHYLGHQFHEDVHGDGYRFDF\¶WRSURPRWHDPHQGPHQWVWRWKHODZDQGUHIRUPs in criminal justice 
practice. There is legal critique evident there, which is often missing from public spaces in 
the United Kingdom, and with that at least some intellectual momentum.  
For now, we can say that rape law however revised, carefully formulated, differently 
constituted and operationalized in two very diverse cultures is not only not leading to the 
successful prosecution of rape but is arguably acting in support of male sexual aggression 
because law serves power and most power remains with men and rape retains that power for 
                                               
19
 John Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4 | United Nations International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda. 
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men over women and for some men over others. Moreover, even where law is re-constructed, 
as was deliberately the case in South Africa, so as to reduce that effect, the very gender 
neutralisation undertaken diverts from analysis of the masculinity that underpins the crime. In 
both instances victims, and potential victims, of rape are poorly served. 
Rape is a crime but the turn to law and criminal justice to resolve rape comes at a cost 
because it very readily focuses attention away from the gendered nature of such crime. Even 
male on male rape is very often an act of feminising the male victim, removing his power and 
making him less of a man than the perpetrator. Rather than focus on prosecuting the crime, 
there is a need to retain the critical focus on gender relations and the gendered politics of 
cultures. This critical focus is necessary because everyday sexism, harassment and a sense of 
male entitlement create cultures, both in Britain and in South Africa, shot through with 
dismissal or diminishment of women and girls¶ experiences, voices and bodies. Those 
cultures shape laws which serve power, and in both countries power remains overwhelmingly 
masculinist. There are different cultures and different laws but similar outcomes in relation to 
rape because in each place rape is the ultimate gendered crime and that gendering needs close 
focus.  
That critical focus has happened systematically for decades in relation to the place of women 
and girls as victims, and potential victims of rape, with work engaging with the criminal 
justice system, charitable agencies, the media, and of course the law, with this last leading to 
the new Acts in England and South Africa in 2003 and 2007 respectively. This work is 
largely driven by feminist initiatives and/or concern for justice for female victims. There is 
little focus on why men rape. Efforts to improve justice for women are frequently challenged. 
Recently, the Justice Secretary for England and Wales, Liz Truss, announced that rape 
complainants could pre-record evidence, and be cross-examined, outside of the court. This 
she argued would allow a judge to µFXWRXWDQ\LQDSSURSULDWHFURVV-H[DPLQDWLRQRIDYLFWLP¶V
VH[XDOKLVWRU\EHIRUHLWFRXOGEHDLUHGLQIURQWRIDMXU\¶6Xmmers, 2017: 9) and hopefully 
protect victims and improve conviction rates. The immediate response, from a support group 
for male victims of false accusation, Accused.me.com, was that this would lead to wrongful 
conviction, even though false accusation is estimated to constitute only 2-3% of rape 
allegations (ibid).  
Certainly all these efforts, over decades, have placed sexual violence against women and girls 
on the change agenda but it does seem that the close relationship of law to power ensures that 
the interests of those with power are served best by, however thoughtfully, revised 
legislation.  Yet not engaging in legislative reform effectively would mean accepting violence 
against women and girls, as well as broader inequities. µNRSDUWRIWKHZRPHQ¶Vmovement is 
XQGHUDQ\LOOXVLRQWKDWWKHODZLVJHQXLQHO\WUDQVIRUPDWLYH¶0HQRQ, 2004, cited in Artz and 
Smythe, 2008:20) but challenging ODZV¶ µPDVFXOLQLVWGLPHQVLRQV¶$UW]DQG6P\WKH, 
SODFHVWKHUHDOLW\RIZRPHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHLQWKHSXEOLFH\HDQGPXVWEHSDUWRID
strategy for change. In practice, though, the efforts to use the law to curtail rape and rapists 
are limited by the cultural currency which skews meanings back to old models of gender, 
which ultimately serve hetero-sexual masculine and patriarchal interests. 
Challenging those interests by focusing on the language that services them brings its own 
problems, including the risk of:   
Being mistaken for a radical feminist or some other unspecified kind of extremist; being 
traduced on the one hand as a nihilist and on the other as a law and order ideologue; 
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VSHQGLQJLQRUGLQDWHDPRXQWVRIWLPHXQSDFNLQJGLVFRXUVHVRIMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUPHQ¶s 
violence only to be told discourse analysis is past. (Howe 2008: 218) 
But it is worth continuing to analyse and challenge masculinist discursive constructions 
because not to do so leaves them and the injustice, gender inequity and violence they 
underwrite in place, however profound resistance to change is. Michael Kimmel, in a speech 
RQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO:RPHQ¶V'D\LQSDYHGDZD\IRUZDUGEXWPDQ\\HDUVODWHUWKH
evidence of high levels of rape and low conviction rates, suggests it is going to be a slow and 
difficult journey. For Kimmel it is essential for men to change, to understand they are not 
entitled to consume women's bodies, however they might be supplied. His call to men 
deserves re-iterating because ultimately men can stop rape: 
The feminist transformation of society is a revolution-in-progress. For nearly two 
centuries, we men have met insecurity by frantically shoring up our privilege or by 
running away. These strategies have never brought us the security and the peace we have 
sought. Perhaps now, as men, we can stand with women and embrace the rest of this 
revolution - embrace it because of our sense of justice and fairness, embrace it for our 
children, our wives, our partners, and ourselves (Kimmel, 2001).  
<HWWKHFRQWLQXLQJHYLGHQFHRIZRPHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRIERWKUDSHDQGre-victimisation in the 
justice system shows change is taking a long time and continued challenge is important. 
Sometimes too it is worth stating the obvious: that the intransigence of sexual violence is 
certainly buoyed by authoritative, discursive formulations like the law but the intransigence is 
ultimately due to men, without whose will and work to change gendered power relations little 
can be done. 
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